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Book Reviews 
Anatomy of Criticism by Northrop Frye. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1957. Pp. x + 383. $6.00. 
This book on the theory of literary criticism is at once radical and traditional, 
bold and academic. It begins with a concept of the function of criticism that 
recalls Aristode's aim to build up some rational order in the realm of art. Mr. 
Frye boldly rejects interpreting and evaluating particular works as a primary 
aim of criticism; this aim seems to him not only endless but futile because it 
merely reflects changes in the history of taste, instead of building up a body of 
coherent fact about literature. His view of criticism as an autonomous field of 
knowledge leads him to treat the most hlghly regarded critics in the English 
tradition as mere good readers, not" genuine critics." A critic like Arnold only 
"represents the reading public at its most expert and judicious" (p. 8). The 
genuine critics are the literary students of all kinds who make permanent con-
tributions to our Imowledge. His complaint about literary scholarship is only 
that it has stopped short of its potentialities. He revives the hope of a few genera-
tions ago that literary criticism may develop much farther than it has done as a 
science. He willingly gives up the conscious evaluative function of criticism; 
and yet he believes that literary criticism establishes the canon of the tradition 
and the content of literary education without conscious evaluation of particular 
works. 
Mr. Frye thinks of the critic's function as the systematic study of literature 
as a whole, of seeing each work only as a part of that" total order." He accepts 
as profoundly true and as a germinating critical idea the suggestion of T. S. Eliot 
that the existing monuments of literature form an ideal order among themselves, 
and he attempts throughout his book to describe this order. He seems to think 
of it not as being constandy modified by new works, as Eliot did, but as a fixed 
order which new works only make manifest in different ways. .Mr. Frye seems 
academic in his rejection of any such aim as II to correct taste" or to influence 
the future course of literature. His ideal critic II describes and co-ordinates," and 
unlike most practicing poets who have been critics his critic progresses toward 
great catholicity of taste based rather upon lmowledge and understanding than 
upon personal likes and dislikes. These ideas suggest why Mr. Frye calls his 
introduction "polemical," but his attitude to all criticism, as to all literature, is 
catholic. 
He would accept all kinds as useful, and in his four substantive chapters 
(modestly called "essays") he attempts to see four different kinds of criticism 
in perspective, from his own point of view. He describes first the historical 
U modes" which he defines; then the kind of criticism which interprets and 
evaluates symbols; third, archetypal forms of imagery and narrative; and finally, 
U rhetorical criticism" -the treatment of the verbal surface of literature. His 
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own approach leads him to the principal questions of literary theory. His method 
in each chapter is to take a broad view of the whole body of literature, to make 
broad discriminations, and to order and classify what he sees. Illustrative refer~ 
ences are plentiful, and often very suggestive, but particular works are seen only 
as from a distance, and particulars are deliberately overlooked. Mr. Frye, like 
a draughtsman sketching from nature, seems to half close his eye in order to see 
the main outlines more clearly. It is these alone that he wants to see . 
. Mr. Frye is explicit in not rejecting any approaches to literature, and he tries 
rather to open the way for fruitful exchange and cooperation between various 
kinds of literary students. Yet his concept of the function of criticism seems 
inevitably to throw a special emphasis on what he calls "archetypal criticism," 
and the third essay, with this title, seems the most richly suggestive in the book. 
Archetypal criticism, as he describes it, studies the forms which are repeatedly 
embodied in literature as patterns of imagery or narrative. In his view, the literary 
structures which continually and significantly elicit our deepest responses are 
best studied in the archetypal myths. And these myths are present, though seem-
ingly "displaced," even in sophisticated literary works. Archetypal criticism, 
which Mr. Frye recommends especially (p. 104), would involve careful and objec-
tive comparisons of literary works in all times and places in the way that tradi-
tional ballad forms, for example, have been traced and studied. He describes 
five categories of archetypal images and four categories of narrative. The first 
range from "images of the highest human aspiration" and desire to "images of 
all that desire rejects." Mr. Frye's classification and description is intensely inter-
esting, but he admits (p. 158) that in a particular work the archetypal images 
may be only" latent" and that this latent meaning, though "one factor," is not 
the "real content" of the work. The archetypes are presumably of paramount 
importance not for the interpretation of a literary work, but for understanding 
"literature as a whole," and for explaining the appeal of particular works. 
The treatment of archetypal narratives-tragic, comic, romantic, ironic-is again 
impressive, and perhaps more suggestive for concrete analysis than the descriptions 
of archetypal symbols. Tragedy, for example, is discriminated from comedy as 
a story of the hero's alienation from his society; comedy being a story of his 
integration. Without rejecting the insights of Aristotle, Mr. Frye follows a 
Christian tradition in considering Adam's fall as the archetype of tragedy. His 
fall led to a loss of freedom, and Mr. Frye treats this as the characteristic theme 
of all tragedy. Christian tragedy is possible, he would say, because the Christian 
view of life includes the tragic, though it does not stop with it. He treats the 
quest-theme as characteristic of the romance narrative, which includes, like the 
Christian epic, both tragedy and comedy. These general discriminations are 
extremely interesting and suggestive for the analytical study of particular works. 
But their value and truth perhaps cannot be known until they have been so 
tested and applied. In simplifying the stru~tures of particular works for his 
classifications, Mr. Frye seems to assume that what creates the powerful response 
of the reader and audience is not the rich, complex, and unique qualities of a 
work of art, but the underlying structure beneath this complexity, a structure 
which it shares with innumerable other works. He seems to suggest that the 
most important part of meaning is understood subconsciously. It is clear that 
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his thought is indebted not only to Aristotle but to modern anthropologists and 
psychologists, especially Jung. 
Mr. Frye defines "ethical criticism" as the "study of the literature of the 
past with a view to its value in the present," and it is in this criticism that the 
critic is concerned primarily with meaning and value. It seems characteristic 
that he relegates these aspects of criticism, theoretically at least, to only one 
of his four essays. And the most interesting part of this essay, again significandy 
for his approach, is the "Mythical Phase: Symbol as Archetype," a level of 
meaning in which the work is seen as a myth which II unites ritual and dream." 
In this essay Frye treats literary convention and originality. Like Eliot he stresses 
the impersonality of the artist, but he seems to go further than reason suggests 
in belittling the importance of the artist's personality and experience. Poems 
are made out of other poems, he would say, and the II new poem manifests some-
thing that was already latent in the order of words" (p. 97). The poet, the 
producer of culture, is thought of principally as a master of technique, and an 
important part of his product is unconscious (all technique "is a habitual, and 
therefore an increasingly unconscious, sldll" [po 88]). In a similar way, Frye 
later writes, II while the production of culture may be, like ritual, a half-involuntary 
imitation of organic rhythms or processes, the response to culture is, like myth, a 
revolutionary act of consciousness" (p. 344). In culture the role of the artist 
is made to seem subordinate to the role of the critic. The" true father" of the 
poem is not the poet but the "form of the poem itself . . . a manifestation of 
the universal spirit of poetry" (p. 98). And it is only the critic that determines 
what are works of art. 
The "order of words" seems to have for Mr. Frye an existence in an ideal 
realm, beyond its existence in speech and literature. Though most of his book 
is concerned with the definition, classification, and description of literary phe-
nomena as he finds them, he is led to postulate some "total form," fixed and 
unmoving, beyond the concrete manifestation. It is like the Prime Mover in 
Aristotle's concept of physical nature. In his conclusion, admittedly speculative 
and tentative, Mr. Frye thinks of literature as II an autonomous language . . . 
in a measure independent of that common field of experience which we call 
the objective world, or nature, or existence, or reality" (p. 350). "In reading 
a novel we have to go from literature as reflection of life to literature as autono-
mous language" (p. 351). He then develops an analogy with another" autonomous 
language," pure mathematics, which has a relation to the physical world like 
that of literature to the world of experience. 
The strengths of Mr. Frye's book are inseparable from what seem to be weak-
nesses. He looks at the whole body of literature with rare breadth of lmowledge 
and imagination, and in his efforts to define and classify he expands our awareness 
of the extent to which literary forms can be rationally and objectively described. 
But the achievement inevitably involves the creation of large abstractions and 
some deliberate simplifications. His book, and even his concept of criticism, 
leads the critic farther and farther from the particular literary work, and from 
the reading experience. One of his aims as a critic is to avoid the prejudices 
of contemporary taste, which, he feels, have always distorted the views of critics 
who set up as judges. One wonders whether his emphasis on "archetypal 
criticism" is not itself a reflection of contemporary taste. The prominence of 
m 
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mythical elements in Joyce and Kafka suggests to him some kind of natural law 
by which the last of his historical "modes" -the ironic-returns to the first-
the mythical. But these elements in Joyce and Kafka may only reflect the same 
contemporary interests in psychology and anthropology which are reflected in 
Mr. Frye's book. 
University of Texas ALEXANDER SACKTON 
Tbe Flaming Heart by Mario Praz. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958. 
Pp. 390. $1.25. 
Professor Mario Praz in The Flaming Heart publishes a collection of essays 
with a single theme-the literary relations between Italy and England from 
Chaucer to the present. A general introduction is followed by a series of separate 
essays, some centered on English authors-Chaucer, Shakespeare, Jonson, Donne, 
Crashaw, and T. S. Eliot-and some on Italian-Machiavelli, Petrarch, Ariosto, and 
Tasso. Dante has a prominent place, especially in the treatment of Chaucer and 
T. S. Eliot, the hiatus between being felt by Mr. Praz to represent the course 
of Dante's English reputation. Though most of these essays have made earlier 
appearances, many now appear for the first time in English, and the one on 
Petrarch, with a valuable survey of the continental origins of the sonnet, appears 
for the first time. "An author's fortune," Professor Praz writes, "is not so 
much measured by a tabulation of quotations, as by the impulse his work gives 
to original creation, or else by the place he occupies in popular imagination as 
a legendary figure" (p. 288). In these various ways, he feels, Italy contributed 
to the establishment of an original literary tradition in England. Though many 
lines of Chaucer, of course, are indebted to Boccaccio, Professor Praz believes 
the influence of Dante is "more deeply interfused and widespread" (p. 78). 
According to Mr. Praz the idea of the framework of the Canterbury Tales may 
well have been suggested by Dante's pilgrimage on which he met people of all 
classes; and if some of Chaucer's characters are historical we should remember 
that the" idea: of mixing history and fiction is eminently Dante's idea" (p. 77). 
The presence of Dante in his mind may be responsible for some of Mr. Praz's 
strictures on Chaucer. As to his" displays of erudition," for example, in which 
the modern reader detects irony, Professor Praz suggests that compared with 
Dante and Petrarch Chaucer "fell into grotesque, parvenu-like crudity" (p. 59). 
What we take for humor was often not so intended, Mr. Praz says. 
The influence of Machiavelli in the Elizabethan drama seems to Professor Praz 
mainly that of a legendary figure. Although Marlowe, Jonson, Chapman, and 
Kyd clearly knew Machiavelli's work, Mr. Praz argues that they used it like 
Cinthio in Italy only to bring the Senecan tyrants up to date (p. 116), and most 
other Elizabethans merely exploit for sensational effect a fictional Machiavelli, 
the product of political and religious prejudice. Although Professor Praz traces 
this prejudice mainly to anti-Italian feeling in sixteenth century France, one may 
wonder if it was not due also to the weight of the tradition in which the ruler 
was studied in a moral not an amoral context. 
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A different kind of influence is felt to be present in V olpol1e which Professor 
Praz feels is "inspired "-in its writing, its atmosphere, and in Valpone himself-
by Aretina (p. 182). A similar" spiritual affinity" is found between A Midsummer 
Nigbt's Dream and Ariosto (p. 301). In observing the representation of a real 
Italy by Shakespeare and Jonson in comparison with a fantastic one imagined 
by other Elizabethans, Professor Praz may be observing not a more direct 
influence, but only the superior imagination of Jonson and Shakespeare. From 
books, and from men like John Florio, as Mr. Praz suggests, they were able to 
imagine a real world, while most of their contemporaries merely repeated cliches 
about Italy. But of course, the Elizabethans had no need or intention of repro-
ducing local color realistically. Though he comes to sensible conclusions, Mr. 
Praz devotes perhaps too many pages to irrelevant questions about the reality 
of the Italian settings of Elizabethan drama. A striking illustration of Shakespeare's 
imaginative use of Italian literature is his shaping of Romeo's speech from the 
Petrarchan sonneteering tradition. Mr. Praz suggests he does this because Romeo 
is an Italian, but it may well be only because he is a lover. 
The major Italian influences came before 1700, after which the center of 
European culture had completed its shift northward. In the period from Chaucer 
to l\1ilton, and especially in the sixteenth century, lVir. Praz stresses the importance 
of Italian literature in establishing a native English tradition. The sonnet, blank 
verse, the Spenserian stanza, euphuistic prose, tragedy, comedy, the religious epic, 
the Pindaric Ode-each begins in England with some Italian connection. Its 
importance may vary and, especially for major authors, may be easily exaggerated, 
but Professor Praz's survey is a valuable reminder of its pervasive presence before 
1700. 
The important essay on Crashaw appears in English for the first time, more 
than thirty years after its original appearance. It finds in Crashaw the "quintess-
ence of the seventeenth century," the literary counterpart of Reubens, Murillo 
and El Greco, and of Baroque architecture. Professor Praz sees in these aspects 
of the seventeenth century some decadent "exaggeration" of medieval attitudes 
(p. 207), but one would have liked more discriminations between this" Baroque 
sensibility," as Austin Warren calls it, and that of the more English Donne and 
Herbert. One may feel that the cultural lag in England made it closer to 
medieval tradition than Italy was in the seventeenth century. 
The final essay, "T. S. Eliot and Dante," is an extension of one published in 
1937. The subject is rich, and students should be grateful for this suggestive 
introduction to it. Professor Praz emphasizes Eliot's debt to Pound for his 
reading of Dante-a reading profoundly important to him both as poet and critic, 
inseparable roles for him. The Italian reader, lVir. Praz suggests, finds Eliot's use 
of Dante "curious." It seems "curious," for example, that Eliot should find 
Dante's language simple and direct in comparison with Shakespeare's. But Mr. 
Praz thinks that Eliot may be responding rather to the general qualities of the 
Tuscan language than to Dante's special use of it. There is the implication that 
Eliot's reading, as that of a foreigner, is limited, and yet Mr. Praz never denies 
that the qualities Eliot finds in Dante are there. Both Pound and Eliot read 
Dante" as if he were a contemporary poet" (Pound is quoted as saying), and 
their reading may reflect not so much a foreign reading, as Mr. Praz implies, 
as a modern one. What makes Eliot's reading and use of Dante seem "curious" 
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to the Italian appears finally due to its being unexpected and untraditional. Mr. 
Praz's main point is that Eliot's use of Dante is varied, imaginative, and subtle, 
and he makes this clear. Though the subject of Eliot and Dante may be expected 
to exercise future students more than any other in this book, there are many 
details of our literary history that may well be reexamined in the light of Pro-
fessor Praz's informed suggestions of broad and varied debts to continental 
literary traditions. 
University of Texas ALEXANDER SACKTON 
The Beautiful, The Sublime, and The Picturesque in Eighteentb-Century British 
Aesthetic Theory by Walter John Hipple, Jr. Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1957. Pp. 320. $7.00. 
For those interested in literary criticism, this work on the eighteenth-century 
beautiful, sublime, and picturesque is difficult, no less because it deals with 
aesthetics, the philosophic foundations of criticism, than because its style is poor. 
The theoretical assumptions and arguments, deductive and inductive, of the well-
known figures of eighteenth-century criticism from Joseph Addison to Archibald 
Alison and Dugald Stewart and the writers on the picturesque, Gilpin, Knight, 
Price, and Repton, are canvassed anew. Curiously, however, a first-rate original 
and highly influential thinker like Hartley, as well as his disciple Priestley, is 
practically unmentioned, while Blair, a second-rate derivative, is placed on the 
same level of importance with others like Burke and Reynolds. 
Literary criticism as such is not considered in this study: the critical implica-
tions for the arts are avoided. Just exactly what contributions to scholarship 
Mr. Hipple has made in this survey cannot be easily assessed unless the reader 
were to follow him patiently and carefully through his tortuous analyses of the 
original texts. My impression is that many of the eighteenth-century treatises 
(with the possible exception of the essay on tragedy by Hume, who is the only 
really subtle philosopher of the period) are not half so complicated, dense and 
difficult as they appear to be in Hipple's turgid prose. For example, Alison's 
Essays on Taste, based on a simple induction, is most perspicuously written, a 
work that has the typical lucidity of eighteenth-century good writing. But 
Hipple's summary of Alison's contribution to aesthetic thought cannot be con-
sidered quite so simple and clear: 
Hume, Gerard, and Alison had, of these writers, the most complete grasp 
of the kind of logic appropriate to an analytic system, recognizing that 
neither deduction from principles of human nature (whether these be 
indemonstrable or established inductively) nor jnduction from the raw 
data of taste is alone adequate for proof in aesthetics, wherein plurality 
of causes and intermixture of effects abound. Both deductive and induc-
tive inference must be used, and their consilience alone constitutes proof. 
But since the powers ar~d sensibilities of human nature which enter into 
aesthetic response are several, and their operations more than ordinarily 
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subtle, the deductive process can not be pursued safely without some 
view of the law towards which demonstration is to be directed; and 
snch view is afforded by empirical generalization from the data of taste. 
Here is the use of consensus: to suggest empirical laws which can serve 
as hypotheses towards which the ratiocinative part of the process can 
be oriented. The ratiocination is the principal part of the proof, and 
that part from which the bulk of the doctrine will be evolved 
(pp.316-317). 
Hipple's thesis is simple, if his style is not. He reviews the whole aesthetic 
system of each philosopher of the period, organizing the remarks on physical 
and moral beauty and sublimity, standards of taste, and the picturesque. He 
restates the argument and exposes the logical framework, his commentary largely 
dealing with the logical consistency of the texts. !-lis method is often exceedingly 
technical and sometimes needlessly obscure, especially when he refers to the 
logic of John Stuart Mill as a measure of the logical structure of works written 
in the eighteenth century. I should think that a logic with which these philos-
ophers might have been familiar-perhaps one like the enormously popular 
Logick (1725) of Isaac Watts-could have been used as a measure rather than 
deliberately to commit an anachronism. 
But the chief methodological defect of tlus ambitious study is its purism-that 
is to say, its concern with aesthetics exclusive of the cultural history in which 
theory operates and, for most of us, takes recognizable form. References, for 
example, to the findings in a work like Beverly Sprague Allen's excellent Tides 
in English Taste (1937) could have given substance to the highly abstract analyses. 
It is as if the aesthetic systems that Hipple recreates are tightly closed, entirely 
unaffected by the social and cultural climate and having no critical implications. 
A comprehensive historical resume such as this ought to have been written in 
accordance with a consistently maintained historical point of view. 
Moreover, it may well be asked, what is the significance of the aesthetic systems 
that are re-presented? Hipple does not supply an explicit answer to this question, 
assuming that they have an intrinsic and autonomous value, irrespective of any 
possible relationship with artistic practice. The reader may occasionally wonder-
as he does with the contemporary" new criticism "-if extra-aesthetic values do 
not provide these abstruse theories with the charge that lends them human 
significance. 
Yet the a-historical method that Hipple has adopted does have one strong 
virtue. Because the thinkers of the period are not regarded with the usual 
preconceptions concerning eighteenth-century aesthetic trends, Hipple can see 
them for what they are, or may really be, without reference to an assigned 
position in the orthodox cultural histories. For such is Hipple's purpose: to 
preserve the integrity of the philosophic text-to examine without refraction 
through alien theories and on their own merits eighteenth-century theories of 
beauty, the sublime, and the picturesque, and so to restore to them some measure 
of philosophic respectability. Thus we may evaluate whole systems, rather than 
the usual single parts extracted, simplified, and perhaps distorted, as in Samuel 
Monk's classic work The Sublime (1935). 
This novel approach leads Hipple to two interesting conclusions. One is that 
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there is no clearly defined evolution of eighteenth-century thought on beauty and 
sublimity. But, despite this negative conclusion, it is curious to see how Hipple 
himself indicates how a synthesis does finally evolve in the eclectic aesthetics of 
Dugald Stewart at the turn of the century. 
Another conclusion, somewhat more significant, is that there is no neat 
dichotomy between objective and subjective aesthetic views. It simply is not 
true to see an increasing subjectivism in eighteenth-century aesthetics, Hipple 
demonstrates again and again. A distinction such as this is an illusion without 
meaning for these philosophers. 
[Burke's] program is not, as some moderns have seen it, a step from 
the objectivism of the neoclassic to a psychological and subjective view; 
this whole dichotomy, applied to the aestheticians here examined, is an 
illusion-all the aestheticians from Addison to Kant and onwards conceive 
of the sublime as a feeling in the mind caused by certain properties in 
external objects. The real differences among these men are to be sought 
in the methods of argument and the causal principles which they employ 
(p.84). 
Hipple thus attempts to destroy what he believes is the false dialectic of neoclassic-
objective vs. romantic-subjective. 
It is a curiously perverse tendency among modem scholars to argue 
that the philosophical critics of the eighteenth century, by tracing aesthetic 
responses to their roots in passions, senses, faculties, and association, 
subvert the neoclassical system of rules and absolutes, and thus open the 
way for rampant subjectivism .... Setting aside the fiction of neoclassical 
rules, arbitrary, absolute, and objective, it is apparent that each philo-
sophical aesthetician of the century subscribed to the idea of a standard 
of taste superior in authority to individual predilections; each supposed 
himself to be placing the admitted standard on its just foundations. All 
found the standard connected in one way or another with human nature, 
a nature universal and in some sense fixed. The derivation of the standard 
from human nature could, and did, take many courses (p. 119). 
True, as it is extremely easy to demonstrate, the writers of this period have 
grounded their theories on psychological pr.inciples derived from their under-
standing of human nature. Hence they have been identified with empiricism. 
But it is also possible to consider all of them subjective because they are so 
obviously concerned to explain the causes of "agreeable emotions," the emotions 
of taste. Yet if the subjective-objective dialectic does not make sense, then surely 
the neoclassic-romantic dialectic, or at least something like it, does. But Hipple, 
pressing his own thesis hard, despite the fact he avers that he has no preconceived 
thesis, ignores the data of cultural history and refuses to admit the possibility 
of trends in critical theory as well as artistic practice. Perhaps, then, Hipple's 
close examination of the texts signifies, as Rene Wellek and A. O. Lovejoy have 
shown, that we have yet to be entirely accurate and logical in our sense of 
classifying terminology and criteria for an intellectually satisfying understanding 
of eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century literature. 
N ortbern Illinois University MARTIN KALLIeH 
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Critical Moments: Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques by George Knox. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957. Pp. xxiii + 1ll. $3.50. 
Kenneth Burke's literature-oriented philosophy has been informed by an effort 
so to manipulate diverse and antithetical terms as to uncover their ultimate prin-
ciples of unity. Burke argues: "You can't properly put Marie Corelli and 
Shakespeare apart until you have first put them together. First genus, then 
differentia. The strategy in common is the genus." The concept of "strategy," 
by which Burke means one's manner of dealing with life, engenders difficulty 
in the principle here stated, for one must go on to say that the strategy of writing 
plays is not to be put apart from voting until these actions have been put together, 
nor can one distinguish the urge to vote from procreative urges until these have 
been put together. Moreover, Burke delays the synthetic statement by persistendy 
seeing the intelligibility of any given action, A, in its otherness, its non~A signi-
fications. To his Hegelian metaphysic one can attribute his divergence from those 
who reduce a work to the humane value of its content and from those who, 
like the "Chicago Critics," initiate and explore critical systems to discover indi-
viduating principles of forms. Burke would neither construct a critique syncreti-
cally nor evaluate instrumentally; he would establish antithesis as a metaphysic. 
What distinguishes him from the New Critics, whose method he approximates, is 
his versatility and range of analogy and, more important, the fact that the usual 
reductive principle of his critique-action-is very fruitful. 
Unfortunately, it is a difficult task to explicate, as Mr. Knox intends, a system 
which is a procession of syntheses. He realizes this (the" risky game" of placing 
Burke), but he is zealous for Burke's reputation and would" establish a Burkean 
semantics" for the II uninitiated" reader. With this task and this audience, Knox 
chooses to define Burke's terms by "contextualization "; that is, in order to reveal 
their proper meanings, he offers various contexts in which Burke used the terms. 
At the same time he tries to trace Burke's development, from II tentativeness 
toward systematic uncertainty." We need lmow further only Knox's concept of 
the determinative whole of Burke's critique to understand his task and method. 
Here we are left in some confusion. In his introduction and elsewhere, 
Knox sees Burke as essentially a propaedeutic, heuristic critic. His grasp of 
this aspect of the critic's work is revealed in his coherent, though because of 
his method repetitious, sketch of Burke's procedures, which he provides in 
the last three of the seven short chapters of his book. The first of these three 
defines the Burkean "comic" attitude. Typically, Knox does not define the term 
itself, but depends on our lmowledge of Burke (which makes his exposition 
superfluous) or on our ability to infer its meaning from the discussion. A comic 
attitude is that of an ambivalent, ironic, witty mind which tumbles words to see 
if accidentally giving them new definitions or values will help them help us to 
discover new perspectives on reality and art. This attitude prepares for ever new 
syntheses by exploring ever new antitheses created by tenns thrown into the 
depository of public knowledge. 
"Pliant perspectives n are the product of such an attitude. In his sixth chapter 
Knox suggests that the principle of this pliancy is Burke's awareness of how the 1;1, 
interests and preconceptions of the critic and the terms he uses interact to :j 
determine what will be discovered in the matter being treated. One wishes that il 
Ii 
Ii' 
d'. 
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Knox had explained in terms of Burke's philosophical commitments why he tends 
to be a "Coleridgean" critic (one who elaborates systems of terms to which he 
adjusts poems) rather than an inductive critic of the "neo-Aristotelian" kind. 
For it is not simply that Burke has the modern linguistic consciousness, an 
analog of scientism, which treats words as though they were tools determining 
mechanically the nature of the work done, although this is partially true. (Why 
not, incidentally, "basic element" words-pity the critic who hasn't an adequate 
supply; "catalyst" words to cause relationships among others; "litmus paper" 
words to detect these relationships?) Nor is it sufficient to account for his 
method pedagogically, as Knox does when he writes, that Burke 
wants to be known as a 'student of strategies,' and would show his 
detractors that his terms are perspectives .... He is always wor1cing up 
some large program, such as 'dramatism,' which includes not only a 
method for charting forces within a work but also a theory of personality 
and sociality. Consequently, he has to go beyond purely exploratory 
(heuristic) purposes. 
This explanation is inadequate, for example, to account for Burke's "cluster 
analysis" approach, which Knox outlines in his seventh chapter. For it is in 
his practice of analyzing poems by isolating dusters of image-symbols that Burke's 
dialectical preconceptions show their influence. An image in a poem is often 
quietly itself but always noisily something else. Thus the" equations ))~patterns 
of similar relationships among various images~Burke charts in a poem somehow 
indicate transformation: the patterns discovered are, typically, polar otherness, 
synecdochic otherness, ritualistic change of identity, surrogation. Again, the 
heuristic principle does not clarify the subject-matter-form identification which 
explains how Burke can discover the structure of an action simply by associating 
images. 
Nor does the pedagogical emphasis make Knox's own explication wholly 
coherent, since by devoting four chapters to Burke's basic concepts before dis-
cussing his method, the latter is made to seem a consequence of the former. A 
radical incoherence, then, mars the work and makes it, frequently, a series of 
disjointed assertions. 
The first four chapters, although they would make tortuous reading for the 
uninitiated reader, survey Burke's important terms. The introduction outlines 
his concept of a poem as an action which, like every practical or verbalized 
action, occurs in some scene and is caused by some agent who is or uses an 
agency for some purpose. Five ingredients compose Burke's basic "pentad." 
Actions are verbalized in order, first, to utter or express the poet (psychoanalysis 
and biography are important here); then to communicate (rhetorical considera-
tions) j then to become consummated when the linguistic framework alters 
(ritually transforms) the first two strategies and makes them serve itself, becoming 
pure act. 
Since all men are actors, there are universal forms or ways of acting~permanen­
cies. Knox's first chapter outlines these basic forms, which can exist on three 
levels: biological, personal-familial, and abstract-civic. AIl three levels interact: the 
body and mind "posture" in parallel. (Thus, for example, an abstract argument 
against socialism might be conveyed in a personally vindictive style using images 
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of excretion.) The action of each poem symbolizes attitudes toward Of adjust-
ments to life. Although the poet uses material proper to him, the basic adaptations 
-for example, expiation, rejection, lamentation, purification-are universal. Farms 
of acting in one sphere (say sexual rape) are analogously expressed in another 
(say a political coup), and our grasp of the principle of unity in the diversity 
of actions is due to the principle of "hierarchy" in our minds. Undergoing 
transformation in the transcendent experience of synthesis-this is catharsis. 
After giving us a catalog of the basic diverse forms, and a description, neces-
sarily as indefinite as Burke's ovm, of "hierarchy," the principle of unity and 
transcendence, Knox treats in his second chapter of Burke's concept of what 
happens when basic forms of action become symbolized in the verbal gestures 
of poems. For one thing, they are altered by the recalcitrance of the material 
(a sonnet form distorts the original motive for writing the poem). Another such 
factor is the inevitable human need to communicate (thus elements of appeal 
enter into the activity). But, as Knox points out, these elements also transform 
practical actions, so "we are still left with distinctions to be made between sym-
bolic acts in the practical world and those of art." 
Because the poem, an action of the author, activates the reader as well, the 
form of the work can be seen as the way the author's act is reenacted by the 
reader. In his third chapter, Knox sketches the ways by which poems progress 
into shape: as an argument-syllogistic progression; as a gradual inducement to 
accept certain qualities-qualitative progression; and so on. Nonetheless, we are 
to grasp the form of the work, not first by detecting the author's needs behind 
the symbolic gesture, or by detecting the pattern of emotional expectations and 
satisfactions offered to the reader, but by investigating the" logic" of the whole 
action. Again, one would \vish Knox had studied this "logic," which is the 
dialectic. 
Had he done so, perhaps the perceptive delineation, in his fourth chapter, of 
Burke's struggle with the "intrinsic" nature of works would be explained rather 
than described. What Knox observes is that Burke, in his practical criticism, 
adjusts the reader's vision not by pointing to the work's whole structure, but by 
creating a thick field of extrinsic data, usually biographical, from which, somehow, 
the intrinsic figure is expected to stand out. 
Burke's analogies and propositions, sometimes absurd, often honor reality in 
being various and subtle; they respect many sciences by ingeniously employing 
their discoveries. One could wish for any exposition of Burke now possible. 
Unfortunately, in spite of Knox's evident familiarity with Burke's more persistent 
words and statements, this work, because it is incoherent and often jargonistic, 
is not a valuable piece of expository writing. 
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